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"A ROSE BY ANY OTHER NAME WOULD SMELL AS SWEET":
HOW AGGREGATE SENTENCING VIOLATES MILLER V. AL-
ABAMA
by Elizabeth C. Kingston
INTRODUCTION
In 2007, sixteen-year-old Rodrigo Caballero, a
member of the Lancas gang, opened fire on three teen-
age boys of the Val Verde Park Gang.' One boy was hit
in the upper back and the other two were untouched;
none of the victims died.2 As a result of this event,
Caballero was sentenced to consecutive term-of-years
sentences totaling 110 years to life.' Under this sen-
tence, Caballero's first opportunity for parole will occur
in 2117, long after Caballero has died.4
The United States Supreme Court held in Miller
v. Alabama that imposing life without parole upon a
juvenile without individualized consideration of his
youth as a mitigating factor violates the Eighth Amend-
ment.' Sentences like Caballero's raise the question
of whether the imposition of aggregate term-of-years
sentencing-wherein the defendant will likely die in
prison before the possibility of parole-similarly violate
the Eighth Amendment. The California Supreme Court,
ruling on Caballero's case, held that it does.6 While the
terminology employed is different, this type of term-of-
years sentence holds the same outcome for the juvenile
1 People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 293
(Cal. 2012).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 See id at 295 (stating that defendant's first
opportunity for parole will occur in 110 years).
5 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ,132 S. Ct.
2455, 2460 (2012).
6 Caballero, 282 P.3d at 295.
as was held unconstitutional in Miller: life imprisonment
without parole following no opportunity for the juvenile
to offer his youth as a mitigating circumstance.' Essen-
tially, these lengthy aggregate sentences are a type of
defacto sentence of life imprisonment without parole.'
Following the Caballero ruling, California passed § 3051,
which mandates that juveniles who were sentenced to
a term-of-years sentence over twenty-five years shall
become eligible for parole during his twenty-fifth year of
the sentence.9
While disagreement exists among the states as
to whether extensive aggregate term-of-years sen-
tences violate the Eighth Amendment per the decision
in Miller,"o states should recognize the high value the
Supreme Court has placed on youth in as a sentencing
factor and proactively move to resolve any potential
constitutional issues with legislation." Whether states
disagree with California's Caballero analysis of consti-
tutionality, the California code implements a system
that reflects a proper balance of the Supreme Court's
emphasis of youth as a mitigating factor with the need
for retribution and proper punishment.
7 See id. at 294-95.
8 As in Romeo & Juliet, "that which we call
a rose / By any other name would smell as sweet."
William Shakespeare, Romeo & Juliet 22 (1839).
Though states may give a different terminology to
these aggregate term-of-years sentences, the name
matters not, as the character of the punishment re-
mains the same.
9 CAL. PENAL CODE § 3051 (West 2015). See
infra Part III for a more detailed analysis of this
statute.
10 See infra Part II.
11 See infra Part I.
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Part I of this Note discusses the development of
juvenile sentencing jurisprudence from the ineligibility
of juveniles for the death penalty in Roper v. Simmons 2
to the recent decision in Miller v. Alabama. Part II
analyzes how different states have handled the constitu-
tionality question. Part Ill examines California's § 3051 in
greater depth. Finally, Part IV advocates for the adoption
of similar legislation across the United States.
1. ROPER THROUGH MILLER: "CHILDREN ARE DIFFERENT"
The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."" Since
the 2005 decision in Roper v. Simmons,14 the United
States Supreme Court has applied the Eighth Amend-
ment to juvenile sentencing in the criminal justice
system to afford juveniles a special status. The Court
has consistently identified the unique characteristics
of youth and their relationship to culpability to justify
conclusions affording juveniles greater constitutional
protections than adults.
In Roper v. Simmons, the Court declared that
the Eighth Amendment prohibited the imposition of the
death penalty upon offenders who committed murder
as a juvenile." According to the Court's interpretation
of the Eighth Amendment, the death penalty must be
reserved for only the worst crimes and offenders.' 6
Three main differences set juveniles apart from this
category of worst offenders." First, juveniles have an
"underdeveloped sense of responsibility" which leads to
rash decision-making with minimal consideration of con-
sequences.' States have reacted to this irresponsibility
12 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
13 U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
14 Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
15 Id. at 556-75. The juvenile in question, Sim-
mons, broke into a family home and kidnapped a
woman. Then, with the help of a co-conspirator, he
bound her hands and feet, wrapped her face in duct
tape, and pushed her off of a bridge into the water,
where she subsequently drowned. Simmons had
proposed this plan and following its completion, he
bragged to his friends about it.
16 Id. at 568.
17 Id. at 568-69.
18 Id. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509
by enacting categorical activity restrictions on those
under eighteen, including military service, voting, and
jury service.19 Second, juveniles are "more vulnerable
or susceptible to negative influences and outside pres-
sures, including peer pressure." 20 Finally, juveniles have
not yet had the opportunity to develop their character,
meaning that "personality traits of juveniles are more
transitory, less fixed." 2 1 These differences cause juveniles
to have diminished culpability; this diminished culpabil-
ity in turn means that capital punishment, when applied
to juveniles, does not serve its traditional purposes of
retribution and deterrence. 22 Therefore, capital punish-
ment is unconstitutional as applied to juveniles.23
Five years later, in Graham v. Florida, the Court
assessed the applicability of the Eighth Amendment
and the special circumstances of minors to sentences
of life imprisonment without parole. 24 Recognizing that
"developments in psychology and brain science continue
to show fundamental differences between juvenile
and adult minds," the Court accepted the continuing
relevance of the factors discussed in Roper.25 The Court
acknowledged that life imprisonment without parole is
the "second most severe penalty permitted by law"26
and affects juveniles more disproportionately than
U.S. 350, 367 (1993)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 570.
22 Id. at 571. Specifically, lesser culpability
means that less retribution is deserving. Addition-
ally, considering the immaturity and irresponsibility
of juveniles, it is likely that juveniles are also less
susceptible to systematic deterrence.
23 Id. at 575.
24 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 52-55
(2010). Seventeen-year-old Graham, while on
probation from a previous armed robbery charge,
committed a second armed robbery. Another armed
robbery was attempted the same night, but a co-
conspirator was shot during the attempt; Graham
was detained after dropping the co-conspirator at a
hospital. The police officer also discovered three
handguns in Graham's vehicle, a violation of his
probation.
25 Id. at 68.
26 Id. at 69 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan,
501 U.S. 957, 960 (1991)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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adults because juveniles will end up serving a greater
amount of years and a greater proportion of their lives
in prison than adult offenders sentenced to life without
parole. 27
The Graham decision also adopted Roper's same
reasoning in regards to the pedagogical justifications of
retribution and deterrence as applied to juveniles. 28 The
Court also concluded that incapacitation did not justify
the imposition of life without parole because that argu-
ment assumes that juveniles are "incorrigible."29 Be-
cause juveniles can mature and develop, assumption of
incorrigibility "improperly denies the juvenile offender a
chance to demonstrate growth and maturity."" Finally,
the pedagogical goal of rehabilitation clearly supports
the elimination of life imprisonment without parole be-
characteristics of juveniles established in Roper, demon-
strating "that children are constitutionally different from
adults for purposes of sentencing."35 While Graham's
decision was explicitly limited to the non-homicide
facts of the case, in Miller, the Court acknowledged
that "none of what [Graham] said about children ...
is crime-specific." 6 With that in mind, the Court held
that mandatory life imprisonment without parole to
juveniles accused of homicide crimes also violates the
Constitution where individualized consideration is not
given to youth.37 Though the Court did not create a blan-
ket prohibition on all juvenile life imprisonment without
parole, it opined that "appropriate occasions for sen-
tencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will
be uncommon.""
THE JUVENILE OFFENDER S CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED TO HAVE AN
OPPORTUNITY TO "DEMONSTRATE GROWTH AND MATURITY" N SUP-
PORT OF HS RELEASE FROM PRISON.
cause prisoners with such a sentence are rarely, if ever,
awarded education or other rehabilitative training.31
Considering the unique characteristics of juveniles and
how they apply to justifications of capital punishment,
the Court ruled that mandatory life imprisonment with-
out parole to juveniles accused of non-homicide crimes
violates the Constitution when individualized consider-
ation is not given to youth.3 2 The state must give these
persons "meaningful opportunity to obtain release
based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation."33
Finally, in Miller v. Alabama, the Court extended
the rule that mandatory juvenile life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole is unlawful to homi-
cide crimes as well.34 The Court again emphasized the
27 Id. at 70.
28 Id. at 71-72. See also supra note 22.
29 Id. at 72.
30 Id. at 73.
31 Id. at 74. Additionally, juveniles are unique-
ly receptive to rehabilitative training.
32 Id
33 Id. at 75.
34 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460-62. In the
first of two cases at bar, defendant Jackson, four-
teen, decided to rob a video store with two friends.
This line of Eighth Amendment cases displays a trend of
continued and increasing protections of juveniles in the
sentencing process. Because "children are different," the
imposition of harsh punishments upon juveniles is more
A friend carried in a sawed-off shotgun and, after
an exchange between the store clerk and Jackson
wherein the store clerk threatened to call the police,
the friend shot and killed the store clerk. In the
second case, defendant Miller, also fourteen, visited
the victim's trailer with a co-conspirator. There, the
three smoked marijuana until the victim fell asleep.
Miller attempted to steal the victim's wallet, but
when the victim awoke during the act, Miller then
hit the victim repeatedly with a baseball bat.. Even-
tually, the boys decided to burn the trailer, causing
the victim to die from smoke inhalation.
35 Id. at 2464.
36 Id. at 2465.
37 Id at 2469.
38 Id. With this distinction in mind, for sim-
plicity's sake, throughout the rest of this Note
juvenile life imprisonment without parole without
individualized consideration of youth as a mitigat-
ing factor may be referred to as mandatory life
without parole.
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likely to violate the Constitution's ban on cruel and un-
usual punishment.39 Specifically, juveniles may no longer
be subjected to the death penalty or to a sentence of
life imprisonment without parole unless individualized
consideration is given to their youth.
II. CONTRASTING APPLICATIONS OF GRAHAM AND MILLER
Miller left unanswered the issue raised in People
v. Caballero: does the ban on life imprisonment with-
out parole for juveniles also apply to aggregate term-
of-years sentences that place parole eligibility outside
the natural life expectancy of the juvenile?40 State and
circuit courts remain divided on the answer to this ques-
tion.
Those that have held lengthy aggregate term-
of-years sentences to be unconstitutional have viewed
them as essentially defacto life imprisonment without
parole sentences.4 1 Per Graham, the juvenile offender
is constitutionally required to have an opportunity to
"demonstrate growth and maturity" in support of his
release from prison.42 Because of the way that aggregate
sentences can be imposed consecutively, in cases like
Caballero the defendant would not be eligible for parole
until long after his natural life has expired.43 Having a
sentence imposed wherein eligibility for parole starts af-
ter death is a sentence that is "materially indistinguish-
able from a life sentence without parole."44 This type of
sentence, like that of life imprisonment without parole,
"essentially means denial of hope; it means that good
behavior and character improvement are immaterial;
it means that whatever the future might hold in store
for the mind and spirit of the [juvenile] convict, he will
remain in prison for the rest of his days." 45 While each
of the term-of-years sentences making up the juvenile
offender's sentence may be constitutional on its own,
the aggregate sentence-the reality of the situation-
39 Id. at 2470.
40 Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 293 (Cal. 2012).
41 See, e.g., id. at 294-95.
42 Graham, 560 U.S. at 72-73.
43 See Caballero, 282 P.3d at 295.
44 Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184, 1191 (9th
Cir. 2013).
45 Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 8 (Ind. 2014)
(quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 70) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
violates the mandates of Graham and Miller.46
Those courts that have held lengthy aggre-
gate term-of-years sentences to be constitutional have
emphasized the particular, specific language of Gra-
ham and Miller and displayed an overall reluctance to
render a class of punishments unconstitutional without
explicit guidance from the Supreme Court. In a situa-
tion of aggregate sentences, each singular sentence is
constitutional on its own. 47 In order to render aggregate
sentences unconstitutional, courts would have to make
a substantial step to consider the sentences as a whole,
not individually.48 Some courts have refused to do so be-
cause Graham and Miller explicitly limit their holdings to
sentences of life without parole.49 "Nothing in Graham
even applies to sentences for multiple convictions, as
Graham conducted no analysis of sentences for multiple
convictions and provides no guidance on how to handle
such sentences."o As Justice Alito claimed in his dissent
from Graham, "[n]othing in the Court's opinion affects
the imposition of a sentence to a term of years without
the possibility of parole."" Without express indication
from a majority of the Supreme Court, lower courts
defer to their legislatures which have established the
potential for these lengthy aggregate sentences.5 2
Lower courts' reactions to Graham and Miller
differ according to whether they assign a micro or macro
view to the holdings expressed therein. For courts like
California's Supreme Court in Caballero and the Ninth
Circuit Court in Moore, lengthy aggregate term-of-years
sentences are "materially indistinguishable" from life
imprisonment without parole.53 As such, the holdings
of Miller and Graham should apply to these sentences.
For courts like Louisiana's Supreme Court in Brown, the
Supreme Court was explicit in its terminology limiting
46 See id.
47 State v. Brown, 118 So.3d 332, 341-42 (La.
2013).
48 See, e.g., Moore, 725 F.3d at 1191.
49 See Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 551-52
(6th Cir. 2012).
50 Brown, 118 So.3d at 341.
51 Graham, 560 U.S. at 124 (Alito, J., dissent-
ing).
52 See, e.g., id at 341-42 ("[A]bsent any
further guidance from the United States Supreme
Court, we defer to the legislature which has the con-
stitutional authority to authorize such sentences.").
53 See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying
text.
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its holdings to only life imprisonment without parole,
and without any indication to the contrary, lower courts
should not extend the holding past this limitation.5 4
Ill. CALIFORNIA'S SOLUTION: § 3051
In People v. Caballero, California held that
lengthy aggregate sentencing violates the Eighth
Amendment."5 As a result of this holding, the California
legislature sought to remedy this unconstitutional prac-
tice within its criminal justice system to give juvenile
offenders their constitutionally required "meaningful
opportunity for release."56 Ultimately, the legislature
passed § 3051 into law, offering juveniles incarcerated
for lengthy aggregate sentences the opportunity to have
individualized consideration for parole after twenty-five
years.5 7
In the passage of § 3051, as proposed by Senate
Bill No. 260, the legislature recognized that fundamental
differences exist between juvenile and adult offenders
and that these differences diminish the moral culpability
of the juvenile offender." The legislature intended for §
3051 to "create a process by which growth and maturity
of youthful offenders can be assessed and a meaningful
opportunity for release established."59 In other words, §
3051 was explicitly intended to ensure that the de-
mands of Miller were met in the context of aggregate
term-of-years sentences.6 0
Under § 3051, any person who was under the
age of eighteen when he committed an offense is eli-
54 See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying
text.
55 Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 295 (Cal. 2012).
56 See Graham, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010).
57 CAL. PENAL CODE § 3051 (West 2015).
58 S. 260, 2013-2014 Leg., 2013 Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2013) ("The Legislature recognizes that youth-
fulness both lessens a juvenile's moral culpability
and enhances the prospect that, as a youth matures
into an adult and neurological development occurs,
these individuals can become contributing members
of society.").
59 Id.
60 See id.
gible for parole per the following classification:61
Punishment Year of Incarceration
Eligible for Parole
Determinate Sentence 15th Year62
Less than 25 Years to Life 20th Year6
25 Years to Life 25th Year6 4
Unlike the 110-year waiting period for parole that Cabal-
lero originally faced, here, the juvenile offender-given
a typical life span-will live to have parole considered.
At the parole hearing, the offender will receive a mean-
ingful opportunity for release that considers the age at
which the offender committed his crime.65
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY ANALYSIS AND NATIONWIDE APPLI-
CATION OF § 3051
Though some jurisdictions have attempted to
limit the application of Graham and Miller by looking
only to the specific text of these opinions and refusing
to look at current sentences in the aggregate, other
jurisdictions have seen that lengthy term-of-years
sentences in the aggregate violate the standards set by
these cases.66 Because parole eligibility does not oc-
cur within the natural life span of the juvenile offender,
no constitutionally required "meaningful opportunity
for release" is given to him.67 Considering the uncon-
stitutionality of these lengthy aggregate term-of-years
sentences, state legislatures should take the initiative
to pass legislation similar to that of California, which
ensures that offenders receive their "meaningful oppor-
tunity for release."68
A. Constitutionality Question: Caballero has it Correct
Jurisdictions arguing for the constitutionality of
lengthy aggregate term-of-years sentences argue that
the language in Graham and Miller focus solely on life
imprisonment without parole.69 While this language in
61 § 3051(a)(1).
62 § 3051(b)(1).
63 § 3051(b)(2).
64 § 3051(b)(3).
65 § 3051(e).
66 See supra Part II.
67 Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.
68 See infra Section IV.B.
69 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 63 ("The instant
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Graham is often cited in arguments in support of aggre-
gate sentences," the context of the opinion is discussing
the distinction between juveniles convicted of homicide
offenses and non-homicide offenses, not life imprison-
ment without parole and other sentences.' Still, Gra-
ham and Miller can be narrowly limited to their facts,
which involve only life imprisonment without parole.72
The Supreme Court has not yet extended Gra-
ham and Miller outside of the life imprisonment without
parole context, but, as Caballero and other cases point
out, lengthy aggregate term-of-years sentences are de
facto life imprisonment without parole sentences and
the reasoning of Graham and Miller is therefore certain-
ly applicable.73 The Graham and Miller decisions were
der of his life in prison, knowing that he is guaranteed
to die in prison regardless of his remorse, reflection, or
growth." 76 Life imprisonment without parole imposed
upon a juvenile violates the Eighth Amendment because
it offers no opportunity for release; likewise, lengthy
aggregate term-of-years sentences offer the juvenile of-
fender no opportunity for release.77
The only practical difference between these two
types of sentences is their titles.7 8 In practice, the two
sentences operate to mandate the same type of punish-
ment upon the juvenile offender, a punishment that has
been ruled unconstitutional by the Court. States should
recognize that the reasoning of Graham and Miller ap-
plies to aggregate term-of-years sentences, rendering
EXCESSIVE BAIL SHALL NOT BE REOURED. NOR EXCESSIVE FNES M-
POSED, NOR CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS EFICTED.
explicitly predicated on the fact that juveniles receiving
life imprisonment without parole sentences will have
no hope for release. 74 The bans on life imprisonment
without parole imposed by these opinions were an at-
tempt to "avoid[] the perverse consequence in which
the lack of maturity that led to an offender's crime is
reinforced" by the impossibility of release. 75 Just as a ju-
venile offender sentenced to life imprisonment without
parole, a juvenile offender sentenced to a lengthy ag-
gregate term-of-years sentence "must live the remain-
case concerns only those juvenile offenders sen-
tenced to life without parole solely for a nonhomi-
cide offense.").
70 E.g., Bunch, 685 F.3d at 551.
71 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 63 ("The State
contends that this study's tally is inaccurate be-
cause it does not count juvenile offenders who were
convicted of both a homicide and a nonhomicide
offense . . . .").
72 See id. at 52; Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct.
2455, 2460 (2012).
73 See, e.g., Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 294-95
(Cal. 2012).
74 See, e.g., Graham, 560 U.S. at 79 ("Life
in prison without the possibility of parole gives
no chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no
chance for reconciliation with society, no hope.").
75 Id.
them unconstitutional, and move to remedy their penal
systems accordingly.79
76 Moore, 725 F.3d at 1192.
77 See id. at 1191-92 ("[S]entence of 254 years
is materially indistinguishable from a life sentence
without parole because [the defendant] will not be
eligible for parole within his lifetime. . . . His sen-
tence results in the same consequences as Graham's
sentence.").
78 See Caballero, 282 P.3d at 295 (referenc-
ing the defendant's 110-year sentence as a "term-
of-years sentence that amounts to the functional
equivalent of a life without parole sentence").
79 See infra Section IV.B. While states could
wait until the Supreme Court hears a case on this
matter, some assert that the Court's usage of capi-
tal punishment jurisprudence to reach the holdings
in Graham and Miller means that the Court will
be reluctant to tackle these issues head-on or with
cost-effective categorical rules. See Sean Craig,
Juvenile Life Without Parole Post-Miller: The Long,
Treacherous Road Towards a Categorical Rule, 91
WASH. U. L. REv. 379, 403-06 (2013). In the mean-
time, conservative circuits may continue to deny
habeas petitions of juveniles advocating that their
lengthy aggregate term-of-years sentence violated
clearly established federal law of Graham, because
the Court has not yet explicitly spoken on the mat-
Fall 2015 Washington College of Law i9
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B. Why § 3051 is an Adequate Answer
The imposition of lengthy aggregate term-of-
years sentences imposed upon juveniles is an unconsti-
tutional practice because it places parole eligibility out-
side of the juvenile's lifespan. 0 Implementing a solution
to remove the unconstitutionality from juvenile sen-
tencing, however, raises many practical questions. First,
at what point is the Eighth Amendment implicated?
Clearly, a 110-year sentence as in Caballero82 or a 254-
year sentence as in Moore83 do so because the juvenile
offender will die prior to parole eligibility. But what
about a 60-year sentence? A 40-year sentence? In order
to be a meaningful opportunity for release, at what
phase of the offender's life must parole eligibility begin?
Second, can an offender's life be quantified in that man-
ner? While estimates exist as to life expectancy, varia-
tions exist based on gender and age, and life expectancy
is also significantly shorter in prison.84 Finally, should
ter. See Bunch, 685 F.3d at 552 (holding that deny-
ing the defendant's petition was "further supported
by the fact that courts across the country are split
over whether Graham bars a court from sentenc-
ing a juvenile nonhomicide offender to consecutive,
fixed terms resulting in an aggregate sentence that
exceeds the defendant's life expectancy"). Until the
Court has spoken, defendants like the defendant
in Bunch will receive no relief where it should be
mandated.
80 See supra Section IV.A.
81 See Caballero, 282 P.3d at 295 (requiring
that a "state must provide a juvenile offender 'with
some realistic opportunity to obtain release' from
prison during his or her expected lifetime") (empha-
sis added).
82 Id. at 293.
83 Moore, 725 F.3d at 1191.
84 Mortality tables exist and are currently uti-
lized by government agencies including the Internal
Revenue Service and the Social Security Adminis-
tration and could be utilized. However, their usage
in sentencing may create an avenue for challenge
by an offender with health issues. Additionally, it
is unclear whether the courts should use estimated
mortality based on a person outside of prison, or es-
timated mortality based on an imprisoned individual
there be a bright-line rule or a case-by-case basis for
reviewing the offenders' eligibility for parole?
Thus far, § 3051, implemented by the California
legislature in response to the Caballero ruling, is the
most effective solution to these issues." Rather than
complex calculations as to the life expectancy of each ju-
venile offender, § 3051 sets up a tiered system whereby
the offender will be eligible for parole in a set amount
of years depending on his initial sentence.86 This system
ensures that those offenders who committed the worst
crimes-those receiving an original sentence of twenty-
five years to life-will also serve the greatest amount of
time in prison before becoming parole-eligible." Addi-
tionally, the statute only mandates that juvenile offend-
ers will become parole-eligible at the designated time
and meet with the parole board." It does not mandate
any type of release for the offender, only the possibly of
release.89 Therefore, in order to be released, the offend-
er must still satisfy the requirements of that state for
being awarded parole.90 The statute does not function-
ally affect how the state makes the decision to grant
parole, except to ensure that the diminished culpability
of youth is taken into account as a factor.91
Section 3051 provides a solution to Graham's
mandate of providing juvenile offenders with "meaning-
ful opportunity for release" while furthering the peda-
gogical justifications for punishment. While opponents
may argue that offering parole to juvenile offenders sen-
tenced to lengthy term-of-years sentences violates the
principles of retribution and incapacitation, those of-
fenders with the worst crimes are, at minimum, still sub-
jected to twenty-five years in prison without parole-
the entire period of the juvenile's young adulthood. 92
Additionally, offenders only receive the opportunity for
parole: should the circumstances of the crime and the
development-or lack thereof-of the offender indicate
that the offender should remain in prison, parole will
be denied. Just as Graham and Miller do not require
eventual release of a juvenile offender, neither does §
in their calculations.
85 See supra Part III for more information on §
3051.
86 § 3051(b).
87 § 3051(b)(3).
88 § 3051(c).
89 Id.
90 § 3051(c)-(f).
91 § 3051(f)(1).
92 § 3051(b)(3).
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3051.93 As to deterrence, doubt exists as to whether ju-
veniles are truly susceptible to systematic deterrence.94
If juveniles can be deterred, however, the prospect of
being imprisoned without parole for a greater amount
of years than the offender has been alive must certainly
be considered a deterring factor. Finally, § 3051 clearly
supports the goal of rehabilitation.95 The unique charac-
teristics of juveniles demonstrate that they are receptive
to rehabilitation and, considering their stage in charac-
ter and brain development, more deserving of rehabili-
tation than adult offenders.96
Importantly, § 3051 also does not call for a
major alteration of the state's existing penal system. By
only providing a system for parole eligibility, the legisla-
tion can be implemented more easily than a system call-
ing for the reform of the penal code. Lengthy aggregate
term-of-years sentencing occurs where the prosecution
proves beyond a reasonable doubt each crime commit-
ted and the offender receives for each crime the consti-
tutional, proportionate sentence for that crime. Section
3051 reflects the fact that these individual sentences
are legitimate and only pose constitutional issues in the
aggregate in that they offer no opportunity for release
to the offender. Alternative arrangements wherein the
penal code is modified to prevent these sentences from
occurring in the first place may place too much discre-
tion in the hands of judges or prosecutors; be costly in
that they require a new, original system; or indicate a
weakening of the state's dedication to the principles of
retribution and incapacitation.
Ultimately, even if the Supreme Court chooses
to avoid a decision on the constitutionality of lengthy
aggregate term-of-years sentencing upon juveniles, the
system proposed by § 3051 simply allows for consid-
eration of parole after a set amount of years, which
serves the rehabilitative goal of allowing the release of
sufficiently matured and reformed offenders, while not
sacrificing retribution and incapacitation. The system
is an effective way of implementing the "meaningful
93 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 75. ("A State is
not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a
juvenile offender .....
94 See id. at 72.
95 See S. 260, 2013-2014 Leg., 2013 Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2013) ("[A]s a youth matures into an
adult and neurological development occurs, these
individuals can become contributing members of
society.").
96 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 73-74.
opportunity for release" required by Graham and Miller
within the structure of an existing penal system. States
legislatures should follow California's lead and imple-
ment legislation parallel to § 3051 in their own states,
ensuring that juveniles will always be afforded their
constitutional right to an opportunity for release.
CONCLUSION
The imposition of lengthy aggregate term-
of-years sentences for juveniles without parole and
without individualized consideration of their youth in
sentencing violates the Eighth Amendment.97 California's
implementation of a tiered parole eligibility statute, §
3051, represents a workable solution to this issue that
takes into consideration the special status that the Su-
preme Court has consistently afforded juvenile offend-
ers.98 As such, other states should take the initiative in
passing similar legislation in their own jurisdictions.99
97 See supra Section IV.A.
98 See supra Section IV.B.
99 See supra Section IVB.
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